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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides insight to improve training of personnel that will 
support United States Security, Stability, Transformation and Reconstruction 
(SSTR) operations in the social and cultural context of the Middle East.  SSTR 
operations require competencies far beyond conventional fighting skills.  
Necessary skills include rounded knowledge about the history and culture, and 
language, of the indigenous people in the operational area.   Through personal 
interviews, social science research, and historical literature reviews, this thesis 
provides a framework for training military personnel on culture and social 
interactions using modeling and simulation.  I propose the use of computer 
agents, bots or avatars with the cultural/social attributes explained within to be a 
solution to the lack of training in this field. These enhanced interaction skills will 
further support regional stability, increase cooperative engagements, and 
decrease insurgent activities.  
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The United States military has faced opposition from its adversaries even 
when its missions are noncombatant. The military has defended, protected, and 
promoted human rights, diplomacy, and democracy in places around the world 
that have not welcome American ideals. Societal groups, national or sub-
national, have either embraced the U.S.’s stability and reconstruction missions or 
opposed them; receptivity varies dramatically between European and Middle 
Eastern populations. This is because there are significant cultural similarities 
between the U.S. and Europe and far fewer between the U.S. and the Islamic 
nations of the Middle East. These cultural differences must be explored, 
understood, and implemented in the training of military personnel (soldiers, 
sailors, Marines, airmen, and coast guardsmen). 
Military missions have grown in complexity in recent years to involve a mix 
of peace-building tasks (e.g., peacekeeping or nation building) and warfighting 
responsibilities (e.g., peace enforcement or combating violent rebellions). This 
complexity requires warfighters at all levels to integrate tactical proficiency with 
the leveraging of nonmilitary advantages, including the building of trust and 
alliances with local networks and individuals (Kifner, 2006; Scales 2006; and 
Wong 2004). This research is designed to provide insight into the effects of the 
United States military’s security, stability, transformation and reconstruction 
(SSTR) operations in the social and cultural context of the Middle East. In 
addition, the research suggests social and cultural behaviors to be implemented 
in post-conflict, operational-training simulations.  
Most American military operations have taken place on foreign soil, and 
most of those operations have been conventional in nature (national army versus 
national army). However, in recent times and especially since September 11, 
2001, military operations have grown beyond major combat operations, to peace 
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enforcement and nation building. This complexity requires warfighters at every 
level to understand the political, military, economic, social, infrastructural and 
informational (PMESII) environment of the operating area. As national policies 
have shifted from total war in WWII to “winning hearts and minds” in Operation 
Enduring Freedom, it is vital to understand societal relationships, trust, and 
cultural awareness for the success of peace and stability operations. 
As war and postwar transformations continue, it is important for us to 
understand completely the barriers between our attempts at peaceful stability 
operations and the reality of our actions. The military as a whole is not prepared 
to operate extensively in stability-operations (SO) environments, or to conduct 
influence operations that adequately consider the views of other national 
cultures. The DoD has recently made “cultural competence” a priority 
(Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2006 and DoD Directive 1322.18, “Military 
Training,” September 3, 2004). A novel method of implementing cultural 
competence as a priority is through computer-based training (CBT) simulations. 
This thesis will provide a framework for incorporating sociocultural relationships 
in CBT. 
B. CULTURAL NEGLIGENCE 
According to Lewis Rockwell, author of Iraq and the Democratic Empire, 
and Lola Wheeler, who asserts that “79% of Iraqis oppose the U.S. occupation,” 
there is an overwhelming opinion that Americans are pushing their Western, 
democratic, Christian beliefs onto the countries they liberate and destroying 
everything else. Unfortunately for the warfighter, this opinion stirs dissension 
against Special Operations (SO) forces. As one Iraqi journalist states:  
Citing security issues, U.S. troops have cut down precious date 
trees, which is often the life-sustaining source of many Iraqi 
villages, burned and razed crops, agricultural yields and fields, 
drained swamps, and burned grassy knolls where it is alleged that 
Iraqi ‘terrorists’ are hiding. 
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Now, evidence is coming to light that American soldiers at the very least 
are negligent of Iraq’s agriculture and at the very most are carrying out a 
systematic campaign of punishing farmers and their farmlands on the suspicion 
that they harbor “Saddam loyalists” or other anti-American forces.  
Ironically, the punitive measures themselves are spawning a new breed of 
anti-American might that cares little for Saddam and even less for politics. The 
psyche of the Middle Eastern farmer, whether he be in Jordan, Upper Egypt or in 
the Tigris-Euphrates river valleys of Iraq,  
is that life is based on the land, and the land is the pride and honor 
of every farmer. When the land is defiled and violated, it becomes 
incumbent upon the farmer to avenge the honor of his family and 
tribe. (Firas Al-Atraqchi freelance columnist for Iraq in transition; 
http://www.islamonline.net/English/In_Depth/Iraq_Aftermath/2003/1
0/article_13.shtml 21July 2008). 
Another example of American ignorance to culture was in the public and 
gruesome display of the slain Odai and Qusai Hussein’s bodies on Iraqi 
television. Odai and Qusai were the sons of the former Iraqi president Saddam 
Hussein. The U.S. intent was to show the Iraqi people that the former dictator 
and regime was no more and that liberation had come, however the Iraqi public 
took the display as disrespectful and repugnant (Walsh 2003). Iraqi people also 
saw the video as a reemergence of colonial imperialism. Proper social cultural 
training could have given our warfighters a cultural intelligence that may have 
prevented both of the above situations.  
C. OBJECTIVE 
The first objective of this thesis is to make cultural understanding a critical 
component of the pre-deployment training for all military.  Secondly, this work is 
intended to connect behavioral characteristics or cultural attributes and computer 
technology to set a standard for modeling representative social and cultural 
behaviors of computer agents and avatars.  Lastly, the objective is to give the 
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war planners operational insight into what scenarios warfighters face and what 
training objectives are required to be successful in those endeavors.  
D. APPROACH 
Forty-five minute interviews were conducted with one professor, four 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students and a Navy lieutenant information 
professional (IP). The professor, born in Najaf, Iraq, teaches Arabic, Islamic 
theology, and Middle Eastern political science on the university level. The four 
warfighters, from three different services (Navy, Marines, and Army), are 
currently stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and 
have been deployed to Iraq at least once since 2003. The Navy IP has the most 
recent deployment to Iraq, from March 2008 through September 2008. All 
participants were male. All warfighters held roles or responsibilities during their 
deployment that included formal and informal interactions with members of the 
local Iraqi population. In addition, excerpts from interviews conducted by an 
American social scientist in Israel are included because of related responses in a 
different operational environment. The social scientist interviewed one leader of a 
Christian humanitarian non-governmental organization (female) and one Israeli 
Defense Force NGO liaison (male). 
The interviewees are referred to by their occupation in the remainder of 
the document. Full interview transcriptions are in Appendix A - E: 
 
Army Armor  
Army  
Marine Pilot 
Navy Informational Professional IP(1) 
Navy Informational Professional IP(2) 
Professor of Middle Eastern Studies 
Christian Non Governmental Organization Leader CNGOL 
Israeli Defense Force Officer IDF  
Social Scientist SS 
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The interview protocol included a script of up to twenty-five questions 
presented to participants, addressing a series of topics including: 
- Any situations of positive cooperative engagements 
-  The types of interactions experienced 
- The cultural differences experienced 
- Any social ties or separators experienced 
-  Actions that induced conflict  
- Actions that inspired conflict resolutions 
-  How knowledge of civil and social structured was formed 
- Pre-deployment training received 
- Any suggested training for future warfighters 
Content analysis was performed on the information collected during the 
interviews. From the responses and the literature review, the researcher 
identified two key issues: (1) the current state of pre-deployment training with 
respect to culture (2) attributes that enhance, deteriorate, or describe a group’s 
willingness to cooperate.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
The thesis is organized in the following manner.  The next chapter, which 
is the Literature Review, contains definitions, and a literary understanding of vast 
social science view about culture and theory.  Chapter II continues with social 
science models that introduce terminology and concepts.  Chapter III is 
dedicated to explaining current military training, identifies levels of cultural 
training, and suggests new implementations of training.  Chapter IV contains 
quotes from various interviews to support topics covered in the literature review. 
Further, Chapter IV highlights situations warfighters have faced and suggests 
those situations become gaming scenarios and training objectives. Finally, 
Chapter IV gives a representation of the attributes and system dynamics 
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described in this thesis.  Chapter V includes the conclusions and 
recommendations for future work section.  Following Chapter V is the list of 
references and appendixes.  The appendixes contain the complete questions 
and answers of the interviews conducted for this research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of findings from a literature search from 
studies relating to social science and cultural. The subsections within this chapter 
are what are believed to be an accurate means of capturing a society’s cultural 
behavior.  Further, the information helps identify important considerations for 
military operations, providing a basis and motivation for examination of training 
needs in later chapters.  
B. DEFINITIONS 
Due to the ongoing SSTR operations in Iraq, the main society of focus in 
this thesis is Iraq; but many social and cultural attributes are common among 
Arabic and Muslim people, such that training recommendations can be 
generalized to most of the Middle East and some of North Africa. The aim of this 
thesis is to build a framework to represent some effective societal behaviors in 
military training simulations and explore training requirements across services. 
We begin by defining societies in accordance with past research. A society is “a 
grouping of individuals characterized by patterns of relationships between these 
individuals that may have distinctive culture and institutions, or, more broadly, an 
economic, social, and industrial infrastructure in which a varied multitude of 
people or peoples are a part. Members of a society may be from different ethnic 
groups. A society may be a particular people, such as the Saxons, a nation state, 
such as Bhutan, or a broader cultural group, such as a Western or enduring and 
cooperating social group whose members have developed organized patterns of 
relationships through interaction with one another” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). 
Culture is defined as “the total, generally organized way of life, including 
values, norms, institutions, and artifacts, that is passed on from generation to 
generation by learning alone” (Hoult 1969). This is the definition that I will be 
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using in reference to culture, but will also add that culture encompasses physical 
appearance, internal knowledge, and external behavior common to a cultural 
group. A cultural group is defined as a “group of people who identify with the 
group through a shared trait, such as gender, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, 
regionality, age, economic status, social class, education, or occupation” (van 
Lent, Core, Solomon, Rosenberg, McAlinden, & Carpenter 2007). 
Cultures are dynamic systems. They emerge from a particular setting and 
they change as that setting evolves over time. Cultures are composed of 
integrated components rather than a haphazard collection of interchangeable 
parts. One change has repercussions throughout the system. Rapid or 
haphazard introduction of new, contrary ideas can create shock or confusion 
among people who have been heavily indoctrinated within a culture that limits 
external communication and open discourse. One result can be anomie. As 
Émile Durkheim and later theorists argue, anomie is a reaction against or a 
retreat from the regulatory social controls of society. People who feel alienated 
from the surrounding society may become lawless, lacking an adequate set of 
values to guide their behavior and unable to find their place in society. To avoid 
this, it is important that we understand existing cultural patterns and how they are 
likely to be affected by introduction of new and different values that accompany 
modernization. A culture cannot adapt to the cognitive demands of 
industrialization without also altering social and educational patterns. 
Industrialization generally brings changes in reasoning and education along with 
changes in family structure. The integrated nature of cultural components means 
that some cultural elements regularly occur together; those occurrences 
characterize types of cultures. Industrial nations are likely to show more social 
and cognitive similarities than non-industrial nations. (Berry 1986; Segall, Dasen, 
Berry, & Poortinga 1990; Triandis 1994; & Klien 2004). 
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C. THE SOCIAL-SCIENCE VIEW OF CULTURE  
1. The Importance of Theory and Culture 
There are many different theoretical opinions that describe the concept of 
culture. As social creatures, we are curious to understand why the world works 
as it does. Social scientists research to find out if general rules or laws apply to 
understanding why humans do what they do and believe what they do about how 
the world is constructed. They also ask if the world can be understood only 
through our own subjective lenses, which are shaped by personal and societal 
experiences, or if there are less subjective methods and tools that can be used.  
Theories provide explanatory power and influence or guide research; in 
addition they increase the body of existing knowledge. As is commonly stated in 
the world of science “Theory cannot be definitely proven, only supported by a 
great deal of information or proven false” (Salzman 2001; Lichbach and 
Zuckerman 2002). Both theories and facts are needed because theories without 
facts lack substance, and facts without theories are insignificant or fall into the 
category of opinion (Salzman 2001; Lichbach and Zuckerman 2002). Theory 
explains general trends that can be applied to many specific instances or 
particular cases. Theories can help answer likely questions about the probability 
of an outcome. Therefore, theory and understanding why the world works and 
why people do what they do is very relevant to military operations. (Chandler 
2005) 
D. SOCIAL-SCIENCE MODELS 
Several social science models are described below to introduce important 
terminology and concepts.  
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1. Normative or Informative  
Normative social influence conforms an individual to the positive 
expectations of another. Stated differently, it is the influence of other people that 
leads us to conform, in order to be liked and accepted by them—often leading to 
public compliance (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert 2005). Informative social influence 
is defined as an influence to accept information obtained from another as 
evidence about reality (Deutsch & Gerard 1954). Positive expectations refer to 
those expectations whose fulfillment by another leads, to or reinforces, positive 
feelings, and whose nonfulfillment leads to the opposite. In general, one would 
expect that the strength of these internalized self-expectations would reflect the 
individual's prior experiences as sources of need satisfaction, by conforming to 
his own judgments or by self reliance he has won approval from such significant 
others as his parents (Deutsch & Gerard 1995). Though not equivalent, Arab and 
American society both exhibit normative and informative social behavior. The 
Arab world with its collective society (discussed below), seems to be heavily 
influenced by the group’s expectation of behavior. Avatars in computer-based 
training that represent human behavior where the agents are of the same faith 
and culture should possess attributes that demonstrate normative or informative 
social behaviors.  
2. Trust and Normative Social Influence 
Trust is the firm reliance on the integrity or stability of a person or thing 
(American Heritage Dictionary, fourth edition 2004). Generally, group members 
are more likely to take the judgments of other group members as trusting 
evidence for forming judgments about reality and, hence, they would be more 
susceptible to informative social influence than would non-members (Deutsch & 
Gerard 1954). The greater trust usually reflects more experience of the reliability 
of the judgments of other members and more confidence in the benevolence of 
their motivations. However, when group members have had no prior experience 
together and when it is apparent in both the group and nongroup situations that 
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the others are motivated and in a position to report correct judgments, there is no 
reason to expect differential susceptibility to informative social influence among 
group and non-group members (Deutsch & Gerard 1954). 
3. Activisms and Collective Efficacy 
There is a strong relationship between the level of social and community 
problems in a neighborhood and the level of individual and community 
involvement and collective efficacy for that neighborhood. Collective efficacy is 
the aggregated belief of members in their group’s ability to accomplish their 
shared goals (Foster-Fishman, Cantillon, Pierce, & Van Egeren 2007). Different 
elements of neighborhood conditions are more or less important to foster 
different types and levels of resident involvement. For example, perceptions of 
neighborhood problems predict whether an individual becomes involved, but 
perceived strength of neighborhood leadership can be the strongest predictor of 
an individual’s level of activity. Furthermore, in economically poor communities,  
inclusion of residents as architects of and participants in the change process can 
produce a healthy community and an active citizenry. (Foster-Fishman, Cantillon, 
Pierce, & Van Egeren 2007).  
Middle Eastern countries, and Iraq in particular, have exemplified this 
finding. When individuals actively and willingly participate in the rebuilding 
process, views of the Western world can change from Iraqi occupiers to 
community aides. This research suggests that in modeling human behavior for 
simulation of reconstruction operations, collective efficacy must be incorporated 
in the avatar’s attributes. 
4. Personality Profiles of Cultures 
It is difficult to understand what cultural attributes are required to model a 
human society. We generally group nations by their language, religion, industry, 
poverty, and political system, and so on. I agree that on the surface these 
generalizations work well to separate groups. However, I feel that research done 
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by Dr. Geert Hofstede, Emeritus Professor, Maastricht University better 
compares national cultures than the groupings previously listed. Geert Hofstede’s 
value-survey module is designed for measuring culturally determined differences 
between matched samples of respondents from different countries and regions. It 
consists of twenty content questions and six demographic questions. I will use 
and explain some of his concepts in comparing the U.S. and the Arab World 
(Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates). I won’t explain every dimension of Hofstede’s findings because 
statistics are not available for “long time orientation” in the Arab world but will 
highlight a few that I believe are important. 
Culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. Cultural 
differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.  
Dr. Geert Hofstede, 
According to Hofstede, the power-distance index, or PDI, is the extent of 
acceptance and expectance of unequally distributed power by the less powerful 
members of an organization or group. PDI expresses power and economic and 
social disparity from the less-prosperous point of view, and not the opposite. This 
suggest that followers, as much as leaders, endorse a society’s level of 
inequality. A comparison of the American and the Arab worlds follows.  
Uncertainty avoidance (UA) deals with a society’s capacity to endure 
uncertainty and ambiguity.  
It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel 
either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. 
Further, UA is the extent to which the individuals in a culture feel 
threatened by unknown situations. (Hofstede 2003) 
In cultures where high-uncertainty avoidance is the norm, the emotional 
sentiment is that everything different is dangerous, and uncertainty is limited by 
implementation of strict rules and laws. Philosophically, high-UA cultures believe 
in the absolute truth and believe that they possess it. However, if the society is 
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open to new things and changes, it is expected to have a low degree of 
uncertainty avoidance. Those cultures are also more tolerant of different 
opinions; permit different views of the world; and seem to follow fewer rules.  
People within the high UA cultures are more phlegmatic and 
contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express 
emotions. (Hofstede 2003) 
The United States has a power-distance index (PDI) of forty, compared to 
the world average of fifty-five.  
This is indicative of a greater equality between societal levels, 
including government, organizations, and even within families. This 
orientation reinforces a cooperative interaction across power levels 
and creates a more stable cultural environment. (Hofstede 2003) 
The uncertainty-avoidance index (UAI) ranking for the U.S. is forty-six, 
compared to the world average of sixty-four. The low UAI ranking suggests that 
American society has fewer rules and does not attempt to control all outcomes 
and results. Further, it suggests that there is a greater tolerance for a number of 
ideas, beliefs, and thoughts. 
The Arab countries have a high PDI of eighty and UAI of sixty-eight.  
These societies are highly rule-oriented with laws, rules, 
regulations, and controls; more likely to follow a caste system that 
does not allow significant upward mobility of its citizens. (Hofstede 
2003) 
These countries have developed a culture that reduces the amount of 
uncertainty, while inequalities of power and wealth have been allowed to grow 
within the society.  
Furthermore, members of this type of society expect the leaders to 
separate themselves from the group. When combined, a large PDI and high UAI 
creates a situation where  
Leaders have virtually ultimate power and authority, and the rules, 
laws, and regulations developed by those in power, reinforce their 
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own leadership and control. Hofstede says that it is not unusual for 
new leadership to arise from armed insurrection and gaining the 
ultimate power, rather than gaining it from diplomatic or democratic 
change. (Hofstede 2003) 
The obvious differences in societies between the Arab world and the U.S. 
make interacting very challenging. Military personnel from a free and open 
society must understand that they will be operating with Iraqis, Egyptians, 
Kuwaitis or others who have a different internal rule set and whose motivations 
are different. The warfighter must also understand that in cooperative 
engagements, it will not be his job or duty to change the society, but to enable it 
to gain stability.  
5. Masculinity Index 
The masculinity index (MAS) describes the degree to which 
masculine values like competitiveness and the acquisition of wealth 
are valued over feminine values like relationship building and 
quality of life. (Hofstede 2003) 
The average MAS of all fifty-six societies in Hofestede’s study is 50.2. The 
Arab World MAS ranking is fifty-two, which is only slightly higher than the 
average, while the United States has a ranking of sixty-two.  
For the Arab world, this would indicate that while women in the 
Arab World are limited in their rights, it may be due more to Muslim 
religion rather than a cultural paradigm. (Hofstede 2003) 
For the U.S., this indicates that the country experiences a higher degree of 
gender differentiation of roles; this stimulates a female population that becomes 
more assertive and competitive than women who occupy traditional feminine 
roles in some other cultures. The equality and acceptance that women receive in 
the U.S. is totally unacceptable to most Islamic Arab men. Again, modeling and 
simulation of a society’s MAS is important. 
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6. Individualism vs Collectivism 
Individualism (IDV) is an individual’s strive to accomplish personal goals 
rather than group or collective interests, also considered selfishness.  
Where bonds between individuals are loose: everyone is expected 
to look after themselves and their immediate family. In the 
collectivist society, people from birth onwards are integrated into 
strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families which continue 
protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede 
2001).  
The Arab world’s lowest cultural dimension is the Individualism ranking, at thirty-
eight compared to a world average of sixty-four. A score of thirty-eight means 
that the Arab world is a collectivist society and is manifested in a close long-term 
commitment to the associated group, family, extended family, or extended 
relationships. Loyalty overrides most other societal rules in a collectivist culture. 
7. Long-Term Orientation LTO 
Long-term orientation deals with virtue regardless of truth, says Hofstede.  
Values associated with long-term orientation are thrift and 
perseverance; values associated with short-term orientation are 
respect for tradition, fulfilling social obligations, and protecting one's 
”face.” Both the positively and the negatively rated values of this 
dimension are found in the teachings of Confucius, the most 
influential Chinese philosopher who lived around 500 B.C.; 
however, the dimension also applies to countries without a 
Confucian heritage. (Hofstede 2003) 
There is no LTO comparison of American society and the Arab World 
because there is no research to support describing the Arabic world culture in 
this regard. 
Figure 1 illustrates the compared societal attributes between the American 
and Arab worlds using Hofstede’s five dimensions, described above. It is easily 
recognizable that the two societies are very different. The groups are so much 
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different that one could expect conflict or difficulty in partnering when these two 
cultures are operating in the same environment. 
 
  
Figure 1.   Hofstede’s 5D Comparison of U.S. and Arabic Worlds 
8. Religion  
a. Islam 
Islam is a monotheistic religion based on revelations received by 
the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century, which were later recorded in the 
Koran (Qur'an), Islam's sacred text, and in Al-Hadith, which describes the words 
and deeds of Muhammad. The faith spread rapidly and today Islam is the second 
largest religion in the world. The Arabic word slam means "submission," reflecting 
the religion's central tenet of submitting to the will of God. Islamic practices are 
defined by the Five Pillars of Islam: faith, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and alms 
(http://www.religionfacts.com/islam/). 
Islam is the most-practiced religion in the Arab world. This religion 
and its laws are the primary factors that influence how people of this society 
PDI Power Distance Index 
IDV Individualism 
MAS Masculinity 
UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
LTO Long-Term Orientation 
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behave. The national laws and religious laws are much intertwined; in the event 
of conflicts, religious laws are said to be more important than national laws.  
b. Christianity 
Christianity is a monotheistic religion centered on the life and 
teachings of Jesus of Nazareth as presented in the New Testament of the Bible 
(Catholic Dictionary). Christians believe that Jesus is the only begotten Son of 
God and the Messiah (Christ) prophesied in the Old Testament, which is part of 
the written word of God that is common to Christianity and Judaism. To 
Christians, Jesus Christ is a teacher, the model of a virtuous life, the revealer of 
God, and most importantly, the savior of humanity, who suffered, died, and was 
resurrected to bring about salvation from sin. Christians maintain that Jesus 
ascended into heaven, and most denominations teach that Jesus will return to 
judge the living and the dead, granting everlasting life to his followers. Christians 
call the message of Jesus Christ the gospel ("good news") and hence label the 
written accounts of his ministry as gospels (catholicreference.net).  
Christianity is the most-followed religion in America. The United 
States, since its inception, has incorporated Christian principles of freedom and 
individual equality, while allowing government to function separate from the 
church (religion). American society tends to have more individualistic behaviors 
and free exchange of ideas than are allowed in countries where Islam is the 
dominant religion.  
c. Historical Conflict between Christianity and Islam 
Historically, the relationship of the Muslims and the Christians has 
been very complex. Both groups of believers trace their origins to the Jewish 
religion. The Islamic faith in early years recognized Christianity as a viable 
religion, but an incomplete truth. Furthermore, Muslims tolerated the existence of 
Jews and Christians under the rules of dhimmitude, or submission of non-
Muslims to Muslim rule and taxation. Initial conflict between Muslim and Judeo-
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Christian people began when the Jews of Yathrib (renamed Medina by 
Muhammad) resisted Muhammad’s religious leadership following the famous 
“flight to Medina” in A.D. 622. As explained by an Islamic scholar in the preface 
to his translation of the Quran,  
… the Jews, despite their treaty, now hardly concealed their 
hostility. They even went so far in flattery of Quraish as to declare 
the religion of the pagan Arabs superior to Al-Islam. The Prophet 
was obliged to take punitive action against some of them. The tribe 
of Bani Nadheer were besieged in their strong towers, subdued and 
forced to emigrate. (Malik, 2002, page 30)  
With the conquest of Medina, Muhammad began building political 
and military strength that enabled him to quickly dominate the entire Arabic 
region (Welch, 1997). The caliphs further expanded the Islamic state, expanding 
quickly over North Africa and the eastern territories as far as what is now 
Pakistan. In A.D. 711, the Arabs invaded Spain and India. Expansion to the east 
and west continued until Charles Martel gained victory over the Muslims nears 
Tours, France, in 732, saving Europe from Muslim domination. The Arabs 
withdrew from France, but retained their rule in Spain for seven-and-a-half 
centuries (Welch 1997). 
Around A.D. 1096, Europeans responded to the Muslim conquest 
of Jerusalem and ongoing Muslim incursions into Europe with a large military 
campaign that came to be called the Crusades. The relationship of the Muslims 
and the Christians grew more at odds during the Christian Crusades, and later 
European Colonialism (Esposito 2002). The Christian Crusades were military and 
religious expeditions launched both against Islam and other Christians. Both 
Islam and Christianity become involved with mass murder over religion, holy 
sites, and religious beliefs for centuries. (Cline 2008) 
Whether a person is Christian or Muslim or of any other faith (or of 
no faith), that person will have biases. It is a natural behavior to identify with 
people of similar religious practices and beliefs and be leery of non-group 
members. Our warfighters must train to understand their own biases and the 
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biases of the local citizen. It is imperative that our training models and 
simulations encompass religion and its biases. I look further at religion and 
politics in the following section.  
d. Religious and Political Conflicts  
In a manner similar to that of the Soviet–Afghani and Palestinian–
Israeli conflicts, the U.S. invasion of Iraq introduced an American-informed 
democracy as the competing ideology to Islam. This provided a powerful 
motivation for Muslim Iraqis to fight against coalition forces and the government 
of Iraq. According to the Middle Eastern Islamic view, democracy is a manmade 
system that is not rooted in the teachings of Islamic doctrine or based in Sharia 
Law. It unjustly places authority in the hands of men, and this authority belongs 
solely to God. It also offers secular laws that often compete against, or even 
contradict, Sharia. The suggestion that democracy would be helpful in Iraq 
implies that Islam and God’s rules are not sufficient for the needs of the people. 
This is highly offensive to many Muslims. Seyyid Qutb, a noted Egyptian Islamist, 
asserts in his book Milestones that  
the supremacy of the Islamic way of life at the expense of 
manmade systems like democracy which Muslims should reject as 
a form of jahiliyyah or state of ignorance of the guidance from God.  
(Qutb1981) 
Further, the inclusive nature of democracy, as advocated by the 
U.S. in Iraq, denies the ideologies and differences between religious groups that 
often characterize each other as apostate. More commonly, this refers to the 
differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims, but it also includes other groups 
that hold different beliefs. The label apostate is especially significant because it 
automatically places the apostate in a lower status than a rightly believing 
Muslim. Many Islamic extremists believe Islam calls for believers to kill apostates, 
so this makes equality at the polling site an ideological oxymoron. From Hadith 
texts: 
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Whoever changes his religion shall be killed. (Abu Dawood) 
It is not lawful to kill a man who is a Muslim except for one of the 
three reasons: Kufr (disbelief) after accepting Islam… (Abu 
Dawood) 
Not all Sunnis or Shia believe that the other group is apostate; a 
significant amount of literature disputes this assertion. The growing appeal of 
Salafism among Sunnis in Iraq makes reconciling at the polls a very difficult 
proposition (Zarqawi and Other Islamists to the Iraqi People 2005). 
Democracy is based on the principle of freedom of association and 
of forming political parties and the like, no matter what the creed, 
idea, and ethics of these parties may be. This principle is null and 
void according to [Islamic] law for a number of reasons . . . one of 
them is that voluntary recognition of the legality of heretical parties 
acquiesces in heresy . . . acquiescence in heresy is heresy (Baker, 
Hamilton, & Eagleburger 2006).  
Another reason that many Iraqis reject the American version of 
democracy is because they believe it to be a morally corrupt system devoid of 
any redeeming values. The freedom that democracy provides allows people and 
nations to pursue their individual objectives without respect to morality or the 
good of the community. If left unchecked, many Islamic writers believe that the 
Muslim world would open itself up to social ills present in many Western societies 
such as the erosion of the family, pornography, drug abuse, and greed (Hoskins 
2007).  
In summary, it is vital to include in any model describing or 
predicting cultural behavior the interactions between religious and political 
systems. In this case it is Islam versus American democracy.  
9. Relationships/ Social Ties: Informal, Formal, Family 
The core of all relationships and social ties are built through learned 
examples of the family structure. People tend to mirror the pattern of interaction 
within their family in relationships outside their family. Furthermore, they often 
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encourage outgroup members to conform to their family traditions or reject 
building new relationships that do not conform. Warfighters must understand, 
through training, the local family structure, in order to negotiate and operate in a 
foreign environment.  
In the Middle East, the family unit is the social institution to begin with if 
one is interested in people and people's lives. It is also the institution to study if 
one is interested in political, social, and economic change in the area, because it 
formulates and articulates that change daily. Leaders in the Middle East may 
argue about the functionality of the institution of the family and the roles women 
and men should assume, but they have not yet found an institution to replace it, 
either in real life or in ideology (Khurshid).  
The difference in political priorities and rhetoric between the West 
and the Middle East has to do with the functions and powers of the 
family group. In traditional Middle Eastern society, the family as a 
basic unit performs many of the functions now expected of the 
state. For thousands of years, in most societies around the world 
including Middle Eastem society, the family group, in the words of 
Arab sociologist Halim Barakat, "has constituted the basic socio-
economic unit of production and (has been) at the center of social 
organization in all three Arab patterns of living (bedouin, rural and 
urban) and particularly among tribesmen, peasants, and urban 
poor. As such the family also constituted the dominant social 
institution through which persons and groups inherited their 
religious, social class and cultural identities." (Lerner 1958) 
The family provides economic and emotional support to its 
members, which might consist of groups as small as twenty or as 
large as 200. Not only are mother, father, and children included in 
the definition of the family, but also grandparents, uncles, aunts, 
cousins, to several degrees on both sides of the marital bridge 
(Khurshid). An individual inherits his or her religious, class, and 
cultural identity, which is reinforced by the customs and rules of the 
group. In addition, in exchange for the allegiance of its members, 
the group serves as an employment agency, insurance company, 
family-counseling service, elderly home, bank, teacher, home for 




There are varied opinions of how cultures are defined and created.  The 
objective of this chapter was to give a quick overview then identify culture 
through a number of characteristic which describes why humans behave in 
particular patterns.  These characteristics or attributes are this researcher’s 
suggested standard for modeling a society of people.  An incomplete list of 
attributes are listed below, the remaining attributes will be identified in later 
chapters.   
• Masculinity 
• Individualism vs. Collectivism 
• Religion 
• Social Ties 
• Uncertainty Avoidance 
• Power Distance 
The overarching purpose for modeling a human society of people is to 
improve the service member’s skills as a warfighter, diplomat, and negotiator.  
Those skills are only enhanced through experience and training and the next 




The shift toward multinational operations, together with a growing 
complexity of work environments, presents a problem: intelligent and thoughtful 
people from different national groups sometimes identify different problems, 
make different plans, negotiate and coordinate differently, and make different 
decisions during complex cognitive tasks. Cutting-edge technology and 
procedures, carefully and competently developed in one nation, may be 
incompatible with the equipment, procedures, and professional practices of other 
nations. Training packages that are effective in one nation can receive harsh 
criticism in others. Professionals often struggle during interactions with 
competent, well-meaning peers from other nations. These problems can 
compromise productivity and the quality of work. 
A mismatch that plagues peacekeeping operations occurs when personnel 
from Western nations try to help those from emerging nations. In their well-
intended attempts to support development, they may push for the rapid 
acceptance of innovative technology. They want to master the difficulties facing 
the host nation and provide a better life. If the people of the host nation differ in 
their approach to change, Westerners may view them as lazy and uncaring. The 
Westerners may be viewed as dominating and disrespectful by hosts who are 
more fatalistic and relationship oriented. Each cultural misstep compounds the 
problem and makes winning the peace an increasingly difficult and remote 
possibility. 
Effective training can correct such deficiencies and create a military force 
that is better able to interact in diverse societies and cultures. This chapter 
examines current training to identify weaknesses and gaps that need to be 
addressed.  
 24
B. CURRENT TRAINING 
Training for military personnel involved in nation building should include 
cultural awareness, cultural history, manners and traditions, social structure, and 
communication styles (Brown 2007; Gooren 2006; Kifner 2006; Scales 2006).  
The services currently utilize a variety of programs that only provide an 
orientation-level overview with some language and customs and courtesies 
mixed in.  
It was like a thirty-minute slide presentation, it was so ridiculous. 
Don’t point and don’t show them the bottom of your feet (Marine).  
I received cultural awareness training for approx two to three hours 
total (left hand is dirty hand, accept food or drink when offered, etc) 
(Navy IP 1). 
Only a couple of programs have detailed cross-cultural communications training.  
For OIF3 the training was centered around what I would call Iraqi 
experts. The classes were set up where he brought in Middle 
Eastern experts that taught like a seminar type fashion, like college 
credit type classes with so many hours of classroom lecture. We 
learned about history, Iraqi customs taboos and things like that. We 
learned about money how the culture in Iraq inter-operated with 
each other and it was very watered down but it was better that 
nothing (Army Armor). 
The programs tend to be at the basic-knowledge level, which is adequate 
for traditional large-scale combat operations but not for the realities of today’s 
military operations, where tactical decisions by an individual can have strategic 
consequences. The current military training programs are missing a clear 
guidance and flexible framework for understanding the fluid and mutually 
dependent dynamics occurring during special-operations missions. In addition, 
doctrine and training programs do not have an empirically based definition or 
conceptualization of culture (DoD JP 3-07 1995; DoD JP 2-01.3 2000; DoD JP 
3.0 2001; DoD JP 5-00.1 2002; DoD JP 3-07.1 2004;).  
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In order to develop ideals, definitions, and a specific operational and 
tactical framework for analyzing culture and society during pre-deployment 
training, warfighters need to know what is available and what is lacking. This 
means the military needs to have an empirical foundation upon which to analyze 
the decisions, actions, outcomes, and consequences that would impact mission 
accomplishment. 
C. LEVELS OF TRAINING 
Army Lieutenant Colonel William D. Wunderle, author of a cultural 
awareness primer for U.S. armed forces, designed the model shown in Figure 2 
below. This pyramid shows how basic information gained at the lowest level 
augmented with specific and advanced training will lead to the cultural 
competence needed by decision makers at the highest level. 
  
 
Figure 2.   Cultural Awareness Pyramid  
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Wunderle’s explanation of the levels is as follows: 
 
 • Cultural consideration (“how and why”) is the incorporation of 
generic cultural concepts into common military training—knowing 
how and why to study culture and where to find cultural factors and 
expertise.  
• Cultural knowledge (specific training) is exposure to the recent 
history of a target culture. It includes basic cultural issues such as 
significant groups, actors, leaders, and dynamics, as well as 
cultural niceties and survival language skills.  
• Cultural understanding (advanced training) refers to a deeper 
awareness of the specific culture that allows general insight into 
thought processes, motivating factors, and other issues that directly 
support the military decision making process.  
• Cultural competence (decision making and cultural intelligence) is 
the fusion of cultural understanding with cultural intelligence that 
allows focused insight into military planning and decision making for 
current and future military operations. Cultural competence implies 
insight into the intentions of specific actors and groups. 
D. SUMMARY 
Discussed is this chapter were weaknesses in training identified through 
literature as well as testimonies from warfighters.  In general there is no standard 
across services as to what is involved and what level of training should be 
required for pre-deployment personnel.  It was determined that the standard 
should include more than just identifying taboos on any level.  Further, the use of 
modeling and simulation is the most agile approach to reaching the large 
audience for this type of training. In the next chapter interviewees discuss their 
experiences, giving more insight into training requirements, scenarios and 
attributes that assist with defining culture. 
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IV. INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
A INTRODUCTION 
Categorized excerpts from warfighters, a leader in a Christian NGO and a 
Iraqi born American Professor follows.  All of these statements support and are 
directly linked to the attributes that are suggested in this thesis. to best capture 
the uniqueness of a particular group, which identifies their culture.  Those 
attributes are trust, collectiveness, individualism, religion, masculinity index, 
power distance index, social ties, and uncertainty avoidance. 
B. ANY SITUATIONS OF POSITIVE COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENTS 
A study of cooperative engagement does several things.  First, it easily 
lays out the who, what, when, and how a goal was accomplished.  Second it 
serves as a script of what service members will probably face again under certain 
conditions which is also true of subsections in the rest of this chapter.  Lastly, 
directly or indirectly, interactions reflect to some degree how and why the person 
belonging to a group behaves.  The quotes in this section key on the whys of 
trust, collectivism and power distance. 
The SS describes a conversation between her and the CNGOL: 
CNGOL says the IDF has been giving her organization a lot of help 
with security and tips on how to work successfully in the Palestine 
regions. CNGOL says that she follows their instructions and they 
support her ministry because they have seen increasing peace and 
stability there in Jericho. The IDF liaison said that hers is the only 
outside humanitarian organization that seems to be successful at 
building positive relationships with the Palestinians. (SS) 
CNGOL: talks freely about Jesus (Yeshua) among Jews and Arabs, 
but she says that she never criticizes Muhammad or the Koran. 
She does not insist that her congregations call themselves 
Christians; rather most members of her church call themselves 
“Muslims who love Jesus.” 
 28
The SS describes a conversation between her and the CNGOL: 
“She has also learned that in every community, she must first 
contact the political leader (often Hamas, sometimes another sheik) 
and explain that her ministry would like to work under his authority 
to help the people. She asks him to recommend ten families to 
help. She then provides aide for the families that are chosen by the 
sheik. CNGOL: ‘I take of his business so I can get on with my 
business of helping the poor.’ SS: ‘This approach, combining 
respect for the leader with the giving of material gifts for 
whomsoever he chooses, opens the door to the area.’ 
SS describes how CNGOL has gained respect as an outsider: “She 
intentionally contacts the mayor, sheik, or leading imam to ask him 
to choose ten families to help. She works with people from the 
camps and from the main city, providing donations to both groups— 
this gains her favor among both groups. Further, she makes no 
political statements, and she treats members of terrorist groups 
with respect. Although she works with IDF, she respectfully refuses 
to “spy for them,” but she will tell them when she sees anything 
dangerous. She does not identify specific members of political 
factions. Finally, she combines her fundraising with tourism by 
inviting foreigners to come and see Jericho. She is always bringing 
tourists here on a regular basis, which pleases the businessmen 
who are not in need of her donations.” 
They pumped a lot of money into the community. We were able to 
drink tea and negotiated with local merchants to buy all sorts of 
things like movies, workout equipment, TVs and softball sets. There 
would be vendors that sometimes would come in and cook for us 
and that generated economic growth and they got a chance to earn 
a living. It also gave us a chance to see how they negotiated, it was 
definitely different from how we do business, no stress, and no 
timelines. (Marine).  
C. TYPES OF INTERACTIONS EXPERIENCED 
This section provides a small introduction into the types of interactions the 
warfighters experienced. 
...talking to various contractors that could offer services to the U.S. 
Army or local government. What type of contractors? Food 
services, waste-disposal services, construction service, vendor 
service for material and equipments. (Army Armor) 
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In Kosovo, I was in charge of town and provided security for the 
people there. First time in Iraq, I was part of the Third Corps 
headquarters, so I really did not interact with any of the locals with 
the exception of very few contractors. The second time I was in Iraq 
I was a cavalry-troop commander, so I interacted with people a lot. 
We were responsible for areas of operations and I was like the 
governor of the towns. They had neighborhood area councils NACs 
and district area councils DACs for Baghdad. I would go to there to 
have meetings. There was a bunch of representatives and sheiks 
there and I would have to listen to their complaints and try to 
channel civil relief funding to places that needed it. (Army)  
They were service workers on our base. (Marine)  
D. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES EXPERIENCED 
This section illustrates the cultural differences between the American 
service member and Iraqi member.  Power Distance Index distance is the key 
attribute of this section. 
Because the Middle Easterners are very big on your word, if you 
violate your word then, in their eyes, even though you did not 
intentionally do it, you’ve still violated your word and broken that 
bond of trust in that relationship. It is very hard to rebuild that, 
regain that trust. So the platoon leaders and whoever is interfacing 
with these local leaders have to build relationships first, which is 
good for both sides, then you get the community leader’s trust, then 
the local leaders are more willing to accept your presence and 
more willing to accept what you are trying to do. It is that whole 
buy-in thing; they’re buying into what you are trying to get them to 
do. (Army Armor).  
We have to be very careful in the Middle East.  If we say something 
is going to get done, they expect it to get done. Now, as Americans 
and in our language we may put it on as “hey, I’m going to try and 
get this done for you, for us we know that “try to get” may or may 
not happen. In the Middle East though, that can be interpreted as 
“hey these guys are going to do this for us or help us do it”, and if 
that does not pan out it immediately erodes any kind of relationship 
of trust that you built. (Army Armor).  
What is interesting is that I was talking to that guy I mentioned 
earlier, and we were talking about the American way, birthday 
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cards, Christmas, and the holidays, and how we indirectly impose 
that on the rest of the world, and it is going to be difficult to do 
reconstruction when they don’t believe in what we believe and the 
way we live our lives. (Marine) 
E. ANY SOCIAL TIES OR SEPARATORS EXPERIENCED 
In this section uncertainty avoidance and trust are the primary attributes.  
Again in each quote there are possible training objectives and role playing or 
story line scenarios that may be useful in computer based training.  
I saw the people that worked together, hangout together most. I 
was with a mix of guys from Syria, Jordan and Iraq and they all kind 
of hung out together, I guess if they were forced to work together 
they would hang out together. (Marine). 
One of the guys said specifically that if you were somewhat friendly 
toward the U.S. they feared being killed. They said if they left 
Ahlizad where I was, they would be killed immediately, because 
they would assume to be getting paid by the U.S. to work. (Marine). 
What is interesting is that I was talking to that guy I mention earlier 
and we were talking about the American way, birthday cards, 
Christmas, and the holidays and how we indirectly impose that on 
the rest of the world and it is going to be difficult to do 
reconstruction when they don’t believe in what we believe and the 
way we live our lives. (Marine).  
F. ACTIONS THAT INDUCED AND REDUCE CONFLICT 
The quotes that follow highlight some taboos but more importantly they 
identify attributes such as collectivism vs. individualism, power distance, social 
ties, and uncertainty avoidance and trust. 
We created new problems by trying to hire locals as interpreters. 
They needed armor and protection, if they helped us then their 
families also needed protection, and some of those guys worked for 
the insurgents and so it was difficult. (Army Armor). 
We would do various things. We would go out into the local 
community get trash and waste off the streets and find people that 
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could provide the equipment to get rid of trash and waste, like 
dump trucks for example. And to find people who are willing to 
work. So you had to talk to people to move it and to people who 
were willing to pick it up. (Army Armor). 
The Iqari police and Army have to be the strategic objective. What 
we saw is that they were really not getting the pay, equipment, and 
training they needed to actually be able to provide security. We had 
to interface with the paymasters to get them paid. They were not 
getting paid. They had major infrastructure problems; I don’t believe 
that the higher-ups concerned themselves with making the Iraqi 
army the strategic objective. (Army Armor). 
Number one was security (definitely), you couldn’t really do any 
relief without a secure environment. (Armor Calvary). 
Reducing the violence, providing security, and rebuilding critical 
infrastructure (railroads, electricity, sewers). (Navy IP 1) 
They pumped and lot of money into the community. (Marine). 
So once you have built those relationships and when you actually 
get those resources and are able to come back and assist the 
community in doing whatever you’d like to help them with, then that 
just increased that bond of trust between he military and the local 
population Then they begin to see our presence is not just merely 
an occupier but one that is truly trying to assist. (Army Armor)  
We built--I won’t say we rebuilt--we helped rebuild a hospital in 
Talaphar that had been controlled by the insurgents. We then 
resupplied the hospital with all the things they needed to provide 
healthcare to their citizens. We also did the same things with 
schools, roads, sidewalks. With the schools, we even wrote to our 
families to send school supplies to supplement what the Iraqi 
government could not provide. We did a lot of stuff like that. Water 
had to be trucked into the town at various points and food 
distribution points. We had the Iraqi Army and police handing that 
stuff out to help mend and build a relationship there.” (Army Armor). 
In general they were pretty normal and they would look at you 
individually, I think. They had a bad impression of the military at 
first, but then they would meet us and got to know us and realized 
we were just like them and that we had families and liked them and 
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we liked the same kind of music. I think their opinion was just like 
others around the world, with the U.S being the biggest and 
baddest on the block and everyone has a negative opinion about 
us.” (Army Armor).  
CNGOL: Israeli Muslims would ask “Why are you doing this 
(referring back to her giving out clothes, food, medical supplies, 
etc.)? She replies “because we love the Palestinian or Arabic or 
Muslim people” (depending on which group was present). The reply 
back was ”but I thought that Christians hated us!  
G.  UNDERSTANDING THE POWER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Found in this section are quotes that key in on power distance index, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. 
They almost have a kind of chain of command. But what you start 
getting outside of the single family unit with the fathers and start 
getting a bit higher into the hierarchy: there is the tribal elders (the 
elders are influential), then you are going to have your local imams, 
then your local sheiks, the neighborhood is going to have a sheik, 
but all will have an imam. The imams are going to be the most 
respected leader in a tribe. The mayors are not really influential, but 
the imams are the most influential. (Army Armor).  
So in effect what that did was it raised the legitimacy of the local 
leader, community leader. It created jobs, put money in the 
community for people to earn a living legitimated through legal 
means and performed as a vital community service. So that they 
had a clean, safe, functioning community to live in. (Army Armor). 
H. PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING RECEIVED 
This section and the next point out that language, religion, and knowledge 
of family structure were absent from training but were required skills on the battle 
field.  This section further illustrates the point that the Department of Defense 
must take a serious approach to standardizing cultural training.  
During the first deployment there was no training. For OIF3, the 
training was centered around what I would call Iraqi experts. The 
classes were set up where he brought in Middle Eastern experts 
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that taught like a seminar-type fashion, like college-credit-type 
classes with so many hours of classroom lecture. We learned about 
history, Iraqi customs, taboos, and things like that. We learned 
about money, how the culture in Iraq interoperated with each other, 
and it was very watered down but it was better that nothing. (Army 
Armor). 
It was like a thirty-minute slide presentation, it was so ridiculous. 
Don’t point and don’t show them the bottom of your feet. (Marine).  
I received cultural awareness training for approximately two to three 
hours total (left hand is dirty hand, accept food or drink when 
offered, etc).”(Navy IP Recent) 
I. ANY SUGGESTED TRAINING FOR FUTURE WARFIGHTERS 
BILAD training where from the battalion level you would go out and 
task a unit to find whoever the imam was, meet these people so 
that you could start having discussions and building a relationship 
process. (Army Armor) 
Being able to speak the language. Maybe some short, brief, simple 
questions that we can ask them. The Americans would ask them a 
question and then speak slower and the guy still did not understand 
because we did not speak their language. So some language 
training would be nice. (Marine) 
Knowing the customs and beliefs of the Iraq people. Knowing their 
religious beliefs. Typical we just do not know the customs and 
beliefs. It was difficult because they didn’t get the training before 
deploying to Iraq. So having something emplaced during training 
cycle would help. (IP 2) 
J. ATTRIBUTE MODEL 
As discussed, the purpose of this research is to better the warfighter’s 
ability to operate with success in an SSTR environment.  To do this the 
warfighter needs training, more specifically pre-deployment indigenous culture 
training.  The researcher is in agreement with two of the interviewees in that the 
best training would be to role play with real, indigenous people in this case Iraqis.   
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The next best thing would be for that entire role play to be captured in a 
game based trainer, allowing the user (the war fighter) to become interactive with 
the system at his or his computer.  In order for this interaction to even closely 
resemble real human behavior the avatars must behave like the people they 
represent.  It is suggested in this research that the attributes shown in Figure 3 
be the baseline standard for those representation. I suggest that the nine 
identifiers be scaled appropriately to the corresponding society, in similar fashion 
to the work of Dr. Geert Hofstede.  Realizing that no model will exactly replicate 
the behavior of the human, the attributes suggested here will facilitate fidelity to 
train the warfighter at the “knowledge level” or higher quite easily.  The Professor 
of Middle Eastern studies during his interview suggested that “tradition be added” 
to the model.  I argue that tradition is a result of the prescribed attributes 
converging over time.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Researcher’s Attribute Design Concept  
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K. SUMMARY 
In each of the above categories (Positive Cooperative Engagement PCE, 
Social Ties or Separators, etc.) most if not all social cultural attributes described 
in the Social Science section of this document were reiterated by the 
interviewee’s answers.  In the category of PCE, the people of Jericho trusted the 
CNGOL’s commitment to helping their friends and neighbors. Another example is 
the Arabic converts to Christianity in Jericho who called themselves “Muslims 
who loved Jesus”; religion and normative social behavior constrained their 
behavior. Masculinity Index and other attributes are captured in several 
statements pertaining to the U.S. Military and NGOs negotiating to rebuild local 
infrastructure.  
The categories used in this section are easily transferred to learning 
objectives for all areas of cultural awareness training.  The researcher also 
suggested that within the cultural simulation each category as a minimum be 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
From the researcher’s personal experience, the discussion of modeling 
and simulation of any event in the real world always raises the question: What 
will be the level of fidelity of this model?  The difficultly here, unlike things that are 
more concrete or physics based is that humans are unpredictable.  There is no 
biopsy or experiment that can with any degree of accuracy explain scientifically 
why or predict how a particular human will behave.  However, as those humans 
form groups and those groups form behavioral patterns, over time those patterns 
give way to identifying features of that particular group. Those patterns become 
the group’s culture. 
This research suggests that there are certain cultural social attributes that 
differentiate one group from another such as: Trust, Collectivism, Individualism, 
Religion, Masculinity Index, Power Distance Index, Social Ties, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance.  The separation is not in any way to imply that one culture or group is 
better than any other.  The purpose of this research is to equip the military 
person and war planner with the skills to understand culture and social behaviors 
of a population.   This research insists that a game based trainer is an efficient 
tool for training service member before they are deployed into new cultural 
environments.  As per the literature review on training and supported by the 
accounts of the warfighters the standards or joint service standards of how and 
what is trained in cultural awareness are absent.  The research here suggests 
that language, history, culture, taboos, negotiating, traditions, religion, and social 
structure be the minimum for a as Wunderle’s research calls it, a “knowledge 
level” understanding.   
The responsibility of a trainer is to expose the trainee to every possible 
scenario in practice so that he or she has the baseline knowledge to make the 
 38
best operational decision.  The post-war operational training is no less important 
than pre-war operational training.  Technological advances with computers, 
computer based training and game based training, surely makes representing 
human social, cultural behaviors much easier than they have been in the past. 
B.  FUTURE WORK 
What follows are possibilities that were not accomplished during this 
period of research.  It is suggested that these opportunities be researched and 
explored. 
• Prototyping agents/avatars that exhibit some of the attributes 
defined within 
• Further define joint training requirements concerning culture 
• Compare NATO nation’s cultural training programs  
• Compare Non-Governmental organizations training programs 
• Prepare a metric for all societies base on attributes listed within 
• Explore the connection between culture and DIME 
• Explore the connection between culture and PMESII 
• Examine culture and insurgent activities 
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I’d like to begin by asking you questions that allow me to understand more about 
your background. 
 
1. What branch of service are you in? Army 
2.  How long have you been in the military? 18 years 
3.  What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of 
service?  Armor 
4.  What is your age?  37 
5.  What countries have you been deployed to?  
Iraq and Kuwait 
6.  How many times were you deployed to the Middle East?  
Kuwait (1) Iraq (2) 
7.  How long were your deployments?  
Iraq (12months) and Kuwait (3 months) 
8.  Did you interact with the local population? 
 Minimum. Yes  
9. How did you interact with the local population?  
Talking to various contractors that could offer services to the U.S. Army or 
local government. What type of contractors? Food services, waste-
disposal services, construction service, vendor service for material and 
equipments. 
10. What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and 
community growth in the country you were deployed in?  
As far as individual growth, economics gives you jobs, number one. 
Community growth, it would have to be electricity, waste disposal, and 
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sewage. Infrastructure-type things that enable people to operate normally 
so that they can have things like business. Electricity to run their business 
to increase employment. Have more job opportunity. 
11. What could you do as a solider to improve those things that you felt 
were important?  
We would do various things. We would go out into the local community get 
trash and waste off the streets and find people that could provide the 
equipment to get rid of trash and waste, like dump trucks for example. And 
find people who are willing to work. So you had to talk to people to move it 
and to people who were willing to pick it up. You would a tribal sheik or 
community leader with a specific neighborhood and you would engage that 
person to find the people who could move the trash and the people who 
were willing to pick up the trash. And let the sheik decide on who’s going to 
do what work. Because this is his neighborhood and community leader, we 
would pay out of the sheik to hand out wages. This increased his 
legitimacy, or if you could not find that community leader, which was rare, 
gave each individual a salary for their work performed. Best answer was to 
find that community leader and have everything run through that 
community leader. Because that kept you from having to oversee how 
many employees and having to go out and spot-check every employee to 
make sure that they were working. You would give it the money to the 
sheik. Let him organize it. Let him supervise it. Let him pay out the salaries 
and then we routinely come and make sure that what we are paying for is 
actually being completed. This was pretty easy. You could see trash going 
away. You see the street less littered and the rebuilding of schools. 
Schools were big projects in neighborhoods. Typically, you would do the 
same concept, you would go to a local community leader who was leader 
where the school was. Go in and tour the school, talk to the teachers on 
what the school needed. As far as electricity work, plumbing work, or 
whatever the case may be. Painting whatever the case may be. You would 
go to the local community leader and tell him what the teachers wanted. 
You would typically try to do this with a community leader. Come to an 
agreement on what needs to be done and you would ask the sheik to find 
those people that had the access and equipment to do that job or all those 
little jobs that need to be done with that school; have the sheik hire, them 
pay the sheik, and the sheik pays the salaries. Then we would spot-check 
the schools and make sure, and talk to the teachers and make sure what 
we asked to be done was actually being completed. And it’s pretty easy to 
see the lights didn’t turn on the first time you went and now lights turn on. 
You know the school didn’t have glass in the windows when you went there 
for the inspection, and now there is glass in the windows. So it’s pretty 
easy to spot check and make sure that the work you were paying for is 
actually being performed. So in affect, what that did was it raised the 
legitimacy of the local leader, community leader. It created jobs, put money 
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in the community for people to earn a living, legitimated through legal 
means and performed as a vital community service. So that they had a 
clean, safe, functioning community to live in. 
12. What level of negotiating were you doing that on, as a platoon leader 
or division?  
No, this was the lowest level possible. Typical how this would work is you 
would have a platoon leader in charge of a specific neighborhood. A 
platoon leader would be an lieutenant in the Army, 01 or 02. He would be 
in charge of a neighborhood within his company’s area of responsibilities. 
He was the one who primarily engaged the local populace. He would find 
out what their grievances were and issues were and he would elevate 
those grievance and issues up the chain of command. Through his 
company commander up through the platoon commander .We continue to 
go up. So in that time the operation priority was maybe stability and 
reconstruction at that time. After those issues and concerns have been 
elevated, those solutions would eventually trickle back down the chain of 
command. You know your higher-level chain of command says at 
whatever level you can have this amount of money to do whatever 
projects you deem is priority within your area of responsibility. And that 
would get filtered to the next levels of chain of command where they could 
apply other resources to help. It may be government equipment, eg, 
bulldozers and you don’t have enough money to go pay for what you are 
being budgeted, but you could pull in from the Army or civilian contractors 
as for as KBR, if that was a possible solution; and you would trickle down 
money and resources to get pull until it got to the battalion level and they 
would look at how much resources they have and how much money they 
have and priorities all of the projects that needed to be completed based 
off the resources they could manage and do it with, and then those 
monies and resources would eventually end up back in the hands of that 
platoon leader to go back and do negotiations with that local community 
leader to get those projects completed. So its kind of a bureaucratic 
process, it takes a little time, normally projects were constantly ongoing, 
so nothing was stagnant and you did not have periods where nothing was 
happening, you always had things happening, but you had to be very 
aggressive on identifying priorities, elevating priorities up through the 
chain of command, be very aggressive on receiving the funding and 
resources that you needed the get into the hands of the local populace to 
do the work. Then there was oversight, starting with that platoon leader 
and his men making sure the job was getting done. Then you had persons 
that were involved with this, the civil–military-operations personnel, who, 
when a platoon leader said this school needs this or trash needed picking 
up or what ever the case maybe, the CMO guys would help organize that 
for the battalion, by going out with those platoon leaders or those 
company commanders to actually see it for themselves. So they were 
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involved in this total process, kind of like the quality-control check, 
prioritizing for his guys which one was the most important and the least 
important. The platoon leader helps oversee this, by doing his inspections, 
making sure the work was getting done; and the company commander 
also did that with the platoon leader, and the CMO guys would also come 
out and routinely inspect. It was like a layered process of checks, 
balances, and controls. To make sure that rebuilding and reconstruction 
was happening to help community growth, get businesses going, to offer 
people a legitimate means of making money, so it’s kind of how that 
process works. 
 11.  What culture issues came about from negotiating with the 
community leader?  
Speaking on Iraq of course, Middle East, the culture part is really tricky. 
You’ve heard that first there has to be a relationship built, the cultural part 
is very tricky. As a new platoon leader you can’t give the impression that 
“Hey, I want to know your issues” and we’re going to commit to things like 
we’re going to rebuild that school. Cause a platoon leader doesn’t know if 
he’s going to be given the money and resources to actually do that. And 
really it is out of his hands and all he can do is really elevate what needs 
to be done. He doesn’t know when he is doing this relationship building 
with the local community leader—after he has found out who the local 
community leader is, which can be tricky—he can’t give this impression 
that things are going to be done. What I mean by perception is we have to 
be very careful in the Middle East if we say something is going to get done 
they expect it to get done. Now, as Americans and in our language we 
may put it on as “hey, I’m going to try and get this done for you, for us we 
know that “try to get” may or may not happen. In the Middle East though, 
that can be interpreted as “hey these guys are going to do this for us or 
help us do it” and if that does not pan out it immediately erodes any kind of 
relationship of trust that you built. Because the Middle Easterners are very 
big on your word and so if you violate your word, then, in their eyes, even 
though you did not intentionally do it, you’ve still violated your word and 
broken that bond of trust in that relationship. It is very hard to rebuild that, 
regain that trust. So the platoon leaders and whoever is interfacing with 
these local leaders have to build relationships first, which is good for both 
sides. Then you get the community leader’s trust, then the local leaders 
are more willing to accept your presence and more willing to accept what 
you are trying to do. It is that whole buy-in thing; they’re buying into what 
you are trying to get them to do. At the same time, that relationship is 
good for us because we began to understand who we should deal with 
and who we should we not deal with. You have got to weed out on which 
local community leader is concerned about his local community and wants 
to help them, or which local leader is corrupt. So there has to be that 
relationship building on both sides. It is tough for us because we just want 
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to say “hey we want to help you rebuild this school, let’s get to work.” And 
then you find out that all that money and resources you just handed out 
went into someone’s pockets for their own means and not what it was 
intended for. So once you have built those relationships and when you 
actually get those resources and are able to come back and assist the 
community in doing whatever you’d like to help them with, then that just 
increased that bond of trust between the military and the local population. 
Then they begin to see our presence is not just merely an occupier but 
one that is truly trying to assist, does that make sense? 
12. Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?  
They almost have a kind of chain of command. But when you start getting 
outside of the single family unit with the fathers and start getting a bit 
higher into the hierarchy, there is the tribal elders (the elders are 
influential), then you are going to have your local imams, then your local 
sheiks, the neighborhood is going to have a sheik, but all will have an 
imam. The imams are going to be the most respected leader in a tribe. 
The mayors are not really influential, but the imams are the most 
influential.  
13. In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or 
American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges 
does this present for people in the community?  
The view ran on both spectrums of the plot. There were those that hated 
Americans and would never accept the American presence. There were 
people that I would not say loved Americans but they saw Americans as 
buffers, they did not trust their local police and army and were a little more 
able to embrace you. 
15. Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead 
some people to support development of their businesses and 
society, and what factors lead others to oppose development?  
I was there during two elections, the national constitution and reformation 
that brought in Maliki. From my own slice of the pie in Telaphar, a small 
primary election was not successful. There were only three voting booths 
and they were all placed in the Shia neighborhoods in Telaphar. At that 
time the Shia neighborhoods were the only somewhat safe 
neighborhoods. Americans wanted to put an Iraqi face on everything, so 
we are not going to secure a voting site ourselves we are going to have 
Iraqi to do that, Iraqi army, Iraqi police and Iraqi citizens to operate those 
booths. So there were not many other sect members that were not going 
to go to the Shia neighborhood to vote, so turn out was minimum, very 
minimum.  
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Conversely, during the election of the constitutional referendum and then 
the national-election referendum, we were able to establish a dozen voting 
booths inside the town of Telaphar and they were in all neighborhoods of 
town. There were no attacks on those voting booths during the national 
referendum, as a matter of fact, there were no attacks our town 
whatsoever during the elections. But it took a very aggressive plan and 
very aggressive patrolling on our part and on the Iraqi army’s to make that 
happen, and then putting the Iraqi police to protect those different voting 
booths. How you did it was Sunnis securing and working the Sunni booths 
and Shia securing and working booths in their area and I think that there 
was twenty times as many voters than the previous election. There were 
attacks during the national elections, but none were directly on the voting 
booths, they were indirect fires and mortars. Some people were killed, 
women, and children. 
16. What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country X or other 
Middle Eastern nations?  
We built, I won’t say we rebuilt, we help rebuild a hospital in Telaphar that 
had been controlled by the insurgents. We then resupplied the hospital 
with all the things they needed to provide healthcare to their citizens. We 
also did the same things with schools, roads, sidewalks. With the schools, 
we even wrote to our families to send school supplies to supplement what 
the Iraqi government could not provide. We did a lot of stuff like that. 
Water had to be trucked into the town at various points and food 
distribution points. We had the Iraqi army and police handing that stuff out 
to help mend and build a relationship there. 
17. What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in country x 
or other Middle Eastern nations?  
Inside the town of Telaphar we put up concrete barriers to control the flow 
of traffic. We forced traffic to flow through checkpoints and it was 
inconvenient but they knew we were making it safe, but it was constant 
bargaining of “does this barrier need to be there.” We also put up a berm 
completely around the town, which was completely surrounded by desert. 
We built an eight-foot berm around the town. The farmers who transported 
their goods were inconveniences because they had to circle around to 
enter in one of the two routes. It was the only way to secure the city and 
make it safe and prevented infiltrations. We also occupied the granary,  
which was the largest job market during harvest season and houses 
where we paid rent and other parts of town that I’m sure they were not 
happy with.  
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18.  What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you 
for interactions with other cultures?  
During the first deployment there was no training. For OIF3 the training 
was centered around what I would call Iraqi experts. The classes were set 
up where he brought in Middle Eastern experts that taught like a seminar 
type fashion, like college-credit-type classes with so many hours of 
classroom lecture. We learned about history, Iraqi customs, taboos, and 
things like that. We learned about money, how the culture in Iraq 
interoperated with each other, and it was very watered down but it was 
better that nothing. My regimental commander understood that language 
was a barrier, a major obstacle, and you don’t have enough interpreters. 
We created new problems by trying to hire locals as interpreters. They 
needed armor and protection if they helped us; then their families also 
needed protection, and some of those guys worked for the insurgents, and 
so it was difficult. So the commander called the colleges in Colorado and 
asked the school to start offering classes and they did in intro Arabic, 
Islamic customs, Middle Eastern history and they did. And he got the Army 
to allow those soldiers to attend the schools for college credits and for the 
Army to then send those troops out to train the companies of soldiers and 
the officers got a booklist of must-reads and you could tell the difference, 
from the first time until the last time. Another example is the “F” word 
which is an adjective, noun, or verb or however you want to use it, and us 
as Americans hear it and don’t get offended by it but… in Iraq it is one of 
the most insulting words you could ever use. They were totally offended 
by it. The word was outlawed in my unit and it was one of those things that 
came out of those classes and seminars and it was anything that we could 
figure out to better our image to make our soldiers understand how we 
were hurting ourselves and to not repeat the mistakes we made the first 
time we were there.  
19. What training do you think would have made you more prepared for 
cooperative engagements with the local culture?  
“BILAD” training where from the battalion level you would go out and task 
a unit to find whoever the imam was, meet these people so that you could 
start having discussions and building a relationship process. Learning that 
you have to interact with the locals and that you just can’t ride around, not 
interact, and find out what the issues are. You are not going to get people 
to stop shooting at you if you do not get your message out to them and the 
only way you do that is to talk to the people. Before I left for OIF3 there 
was minimum BILAD training where they had Americans playing the roll of 
a sheik. We don’t know how their thought process is or what their culture 
is playing the roll of the sheik but we got some do’s and don’ts. However, 
that’s it. It was tough when you got an interpreter and he’s the only one  
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that speaks English so you are looking at the interpreter and and talking to 
the interpreter and you are at the same time are disrespecting the other 
guy because you are not looking at him.  
Before coming to NPS, my unit was getting ready to go back to Iraq. What 
we did was brought in, not just Iraqis, but natural-born citizens were paid 
to play those roles in training so now you are really talking to an elder 
Middle Eastern man or woman and also your interpreter was one of those 
real Iraqis, contracted civilians, so now you are really talking to people that 
really understand the culture and there is a room full of them like when 
you are really going to do a BILAD. The Iraqis really don’t see privacy in a 
conversation. If you are talking to some, everyone is going to get involved, 
unless you pull that person aside into an area that you control, if you 
wanted them to or not. And they are very animated shouting with their 
language and waving their hands, and for them that’s just natural 
discourse. They can then tell if they were intimidating you and that makes 
them more upset because they were not trying to intimidate you. The 
contractors acted the same way. The training BILADs became a training 
team, the trainings were recorded, and afterwards we would go back and 
review what we did wrong and what we did right and I think it was a great 
improvement. I wanted to go back though when my company went this 
time to see how much of a difference I would be in engaging the local 
populace, it was very good.  
20. Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, 
reconstruction and partnering with the U.S. military that you would 
like to discuss?  
The Iraqi police and Army have to be the strategic objective. What we saw 
is that they were really not getting the pay, equipment, and training they 
needed to actually be able to provide security. We had to interface with 
the paymasters to get them paid. They were not getting paid. They had 
major infrastructure problems; I don’t believe that the higher-ups 






1. What branch of service are you in? Army 
2.  How long have you been in the military? ten years 
3.  What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of 
service? Armor and cavalry 
4.  What is your age? 32 
5.  What countries were you been deployed to?  
Kosovo, Iraq (twice) 
6.  How many Middle Eastern deployments have you served?  
Kosovo (six months) Iraq (nine and thirteen months) 
7.  How long were your deployments to the Middle East?  
Kosovo (six months), Iraq (nine and thirteen months) 
8.  Did you interact with the local population? Yes 
9. How did you interact with the local population?  
In Kosovo, I was in charge of town and provided security for the people 
there. First time In Iraq, I was part of the Third Corps headquarters, so I 
really did not interact with any of the locals with the exception of very few 
contractors. The second time I was in Iraq I was a cavalry-troop 
commander, so I interacted with people a lot. We were responsible for 
areas of operations and I was like the governor of the towns. They had 
neighborhood area councils NACs and district area councils DACs for 
Baghdad. I would go to there to have meetings. There was a bunch of 
representatives and sheiks there and I would have to listen to their 
complaints and try to channel civil relief funding to places that needed it. 
10. What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and 
community growth in the country you were deployed in Iraq?  
Number one was security (definitely), you couldn’t really do any relief with 
out a secure environment. Security wouldn’t be a hundred percent but 
 52
security was the huge issue, but it was in Kosovo, too, even though the 
threat was less there to the people. Their number one emotional issue 
was security. And the other thing that the sects or other ethnic groups 
were perceived to cause: trash, trash was everywhere, a nonfunctioning 
trash system was a disaster. Sewage, water, healthcare, and fuel, fuel 
was a big one. There were riots in Baghdad over fuel, due to the perceive 
corruption of the leaders. Corruption was big issue although corruption 
was usually seen by one side as present in the other side, when it usually 
was not the case.  
11. Could you help me understand how people in Turkey/Iraq/Saudi 
Arabia choose their friends and partners?  
Number one was their family affiliation, everybody is related somehow. 
They have a saying,” it’s me against my brother, it’s me and my brother 
against my cousins, it’s me and my cousins against outsiders, and then it’s 
all Iraqis against the world.” So it goes back to the family being the cente, 
or clan, if you call it that, and there is a hierarchy. There is generally one 
guy, a sheik running around with the real power in the system and not the 
government. Outside the family, it was primarily sectarian. Names were a 
big thing, for example, if your name was Omar then you were most likely 
Sunni and if a Shia stopped, you and you had an ID on you it was mostly 
likely a bad thing, cause names tended to name what sects you are. 
12. Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?  
The sheiks, the heads of families or their lieutenants were the most 
influential groups. Also the imams of mosques, which is a double-edged 
sword, because every Friday they blast their sermons on the radio or loud 
speakers; which is usually about some anti-American sentiment. However, 
they are kind of stuck into doing that because if they said let’s all have 
peace and love the Americans, they won’t be imams any longer, they’d 
probably be killed.  
13. In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or 
American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges 
does this present for people in the community? 
When I was there, we had a policy of staying on the forward operating 
bases, which has since changed since I was there. Which I think, was a 
good move. You have to interact with the people. One thing is that we 
provide jobs for the people when we have projects, need trash picked up, 
and other things, then we will get some contractor to do it. Once we have 




this can be problematic and especially if they are from a different sect. The 
rumor mill is huge in Iraq. The locals will come to an American to see what 
we think of the rumor.  
13b. What kind of rumors?  
For instance with the gas, the Baghdad government was trying to 
distribute gas to the people. We arrived at a gas station where the people 
were upset and complaining. The government had planned to ration out 
the gas and distribute it from house to house, but for some reasoned 
changed and decided to give it out a gas stations around Baghdad. 
However, that particular station was temporarily out of gas and the Iraqis 
believed that the officials were not giving them gas because they were 
keeping it for themselves to sale on the black market (which could have 
been true). They will definitely see things through colored lens.  
They would say that people were collaborating with the Americans just to 
shed negative light on them; and once someone thought that you were 
with the Americans, it could be bad for you. For example, there was a rule 
in Iraq that if you had a governmental body, you must a have a female on 
it, which is contrary to how they really work. She had a son that was 
having seizures. We gave her some Tylenol for him because that was all 
that we could do for them and when that news got around, she was killed. 
She had not done anything and for us, other than showing up at the 
meetings and talking to us. Even being part of the process of making 
things better for people can be a bad thing. 
The social networks were fast. Several times, we did cordon searches of 
neighborhoods and the people were all standing out side waiting for us so 
that they could open their doors to let us in. They all knew we were 
coming, even though we tried to keep operational security as much as 
possible. Nevertheless, they all have cell phones and they are much better 
networked that we are, even with our hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
high-tech trucks and equipment. They have cell phones, sending pictures 
to people, and giving instant battle-damage assessment BDA to people 
seconds after a suicide bomber blows up. So, at least when I was there, 
we were slow to combat that.  
13c. Other than jobs, were there other opportunities?  
It is hard to define what opportunity is over there. Everyone was trying to 
make a buck, to make a living out there. There were people who wanted 
to make things better, but they were hampered with the security situation 




they did. There were many people that wanted to help and do good things, 
I think. But they wouldn’t do so if it put them at risk, which goes back to 
security being a big thing.  
14. Could you tell how the local people from the country you were 
deployed to form opinions about whether certain military actions are 
good or bad?  
If it benefited them or their group, it was good. If it harmed them or their 
group or affected their clan negatively, it was bad. It was all perception. 
Therefore, from our point of view, we are running around trying to 
capturing terrorists and that’s always good. But it really depends on the 
people you are talking to and what they’re going to get out of it.  
15. Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead 
some people to support development of their businesses and 
society, and what factors lead others to oppose development? 
 I think that it is tied to the position they had in society before the change 
of government. People that were rich businessmen before tried to hold on 
to their business. The Sunnis were the whole infrastructure before the fall 
of Sadam, they were the ones in charge of all the factories and stuff, and 
that led them to trying to keep that place in society, which was falling 
because they were under pressure from the Shias. I think the Shias were 
trying to figure it all out, because they really did not start out as 
management as a whole. I think the Shia for instance, the Jahaas 
Almighty, they loved to find places where our relief efforts, our civil 
support, our services were pretty low and there were a lot of poor Shia. 
They would go in and set up generators and run power to everybody, set 
up ad-hoc street lights, and they were showing that hey, we can provide 
something that the Americans could not or the government could not. 
They were using that as a way to gain status and to show that they were 
the de-facto government, instead of us ineffective Americans. They 
developed a separate network infrastructure and whoever the sheik was 
that could provide those services, his star rose, I guess. 
16. What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country X or other 
Middle Eastern nations?  
Trash, civil services, medical clinics, handed out meals, and goodwill stuff 
like throwing soccer balls to the kids. The big stuff was fixing infrastructure 
so things would work. In the poorer parts of Baghdad, the infrastructure 
was pretty bad and there was sewage, giant puddles of sewage and 
garbage, up to your knees everywhere and we tried to get stuff going with 
that. Again, it was a security issue, because if you wanted garbage-truck 
drivers to go around and pick up the garbage, they cannot really do that 
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unless they’re secure. As soon as you leave, somebody would come 
around and kill them or scare them off and they would not come back to 
work. In the Sunni areas, it was as if people would say we are Jahaas 
Almighty, and we are providing the services not you. So security was 
always an issue. We had great security when we were there because we 
have tanks, Bradleys, machine guns, and airpower, but when you leave 
it’s hard to control these things. 
17. What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in country X 
or other Middle Eastern nations?  
We supported security measures that made things difficult for people. We 
blocked roads, so there was not a giant network of roads into Baghdad. 
We tried to channelize movement on the major routes and we had 
checkpoints along those routes, this included the U.S., the National police, 
or the Iraqi Army. Checkpoints were good and bad, depending on who 
was running them. If you were of a different sect, the checkpoints may turn 
you away, be harder on you, or do things to you. Moreover, they were 
good because it helped stop the flow of unrestricted explosives and 
weapons into Baghdad, and that made things also difficult.  
18.  What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you 
for interactions with other cultures? 
 We did our own training exercises with our own soldiers playing 
surrogate, fake Iraqis, which was not that great. Then we did a short 
mission-rehearsal exercise, which half of which was focused on high-
intensity combat because at the time people were thinking we had to be 
ready just in case Iran invaded or we invade Iran or something. It was only 
a short period. Rehearsing with a fake Iraqi was like dealing with a 
caricature of what a real Iraqi is, and in some ways it’s not that helpful.  
18b.  Have you had any cultural awareness training?  
We did some cultural awareness training, not as much as we should have, 
I think. When we first got into theater, they flew all the company 
commanders and above up to the Taji to the Counterinsurgency Academy, 
where we spent about a week learning counterinsurgency from some 
special-forces guys, which was great, but we should have had it a year 
earlier. Another thing was the unlearning the behaviors that were common 
since during the invasion. The way we acted during the invasions with the 
Iraqi was not the way we needed to act during the postwar time.  
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19. What training do you think would have made you more prepared for 
cooperative engagements with the local culture?  
Arabic-languages training, classes in contracting and negotiations with 
locals, an understanding of what our piece in the puzzle was as a combat 
unit fitting into the big picture. We had many new soldiers and we were still 
training on the basic shooting marksmanship stuff, so it was hard trying to 
train up for the higher-level stuff.  
20. Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, 
reconstruction and collaborating with the U.S. military that you 
would like to discuss?  
We had a lot of success, not in these terms— reconstruction and stuff—
but in success in detaining anti-coalition people when doing combined 
operations with the Iraqis. Because they know about people, they have the 
expertise with dealing with their people and they can sense who’s bad and 
not, and that helps immensely. They are not equipped for stability 
operations. Then there was the bigger question of, if it is the military’s job 
to do all the reconstruction stuff, or should the State Department have a 
bigger role? I found that the Army tended to make stuff up for training and 





1. What branch of service are you in? U.S. Marine Corp 
2.  How long have you been in the military? Thirteen years 
3.  What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of 
service? KC 130 pilot 
4.  What is your age? 34 
5.  What countries have you been deployed to? Bahrain, Iraq 
6.  How many times were you deployed to the Middle East?  
Twice. 
7.  How long were your deployments?  
Bahrain (five months), and Iraq (five months).  
8.  Did you interact with the local population? Yes. 
9. How did you interact with the local population?  
They were service workers on our base. 
 
10. What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and 
community growth in the country you were deployed in?  
 
In Iraq, I think it was freedom to speak their minds and not having the 
government control every move they make and also fear from bodily harm 
from doing something different than the norm or the terrorist groups not 
want them to do.  
 
11. Could you help me understand how people in Turkey/Iraq/Saudi 
Arabia choose their friends and partners?  
 
I think that it was more about the people they worked with. I saw the 
people that worked together, hang out together most. I was with a mix of 
guys from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, and they all kind of hung out together. I 






12. Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?  
 
From what I saw, it was their boss in a work environment. They all were 
kind of submissive to him.  
 
13. In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or 
American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges 
does this present for people in the community?  
 
One of guys said specifically that if you were somewhat friendly toward the 
U.S., they feared being killed. They said if they left Ahlizad where I was, 
they would be killed immediately, because they would assume to be 
getting paid by the U.S. to work. During my deployment, the base started 
having a lot more mortar attacks and other people would be coming on 
base and the workers got to a point where it was not safe for them 
anymore, and they wound up leaving and not coming back to the base to 
work. I felt safe, but they feared for their safety. 
 
14. Could you tell how the local people from the country you were 
deployed to form opinions about whether certain military actions are 
good or bad?  
 
In general they were pretty normal and they would look at you individually, 
I think. They had a bad impression of the military at first but then they 
would meet us and got to know us and realized we were just like them, 
and that we had families and liked them and we liked the same kind of 
music. I think their opinion was just like others around the world, with the 
U.S being the biggest and baddest on the block and everyone has a 
negative opinion about us.  
 
15. Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead 
some people to support development of their businesses and 
society, and what factors lead others to oppose development?  
 
I came home before the election period. I can’t comment. 
 
16. What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country X or other 
Middle Eastern nations?  
 
They pumped a lot of money into the community. We were able to drink 
tea and negotiated with local merchants to buy all sorts of things like 
movies, workout equipment, TVs and softball sets. There would be 
vendors that sometimes would come in and cook for us and that 
generated economic growth and they got a chance to earn a living. It also 
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gave us a chance to see how they negotiated, it was definitely different 
from how we do business, no stress, and no timelines.  
 
17. What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in Iraq or 
other Middle Eastern nations?  
 
I don’t think anything we did made it more difficult for those guys. 
 
18.  What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you 
for interactions with other cultures?  
 
It was like a thirty-minute slide presentation, it was so ridiculous. It 
discussed things like “don’t point and don’t show them the bottom of your 
feet.”  
 
19. What training do you think would have made you more prepared for 
cooperative engagements with the local culture?  
 
Being able to speak the language. Maybe some short, brief, simple 
questions that we can ask them. The Americans would ask them a 
question and then speak slower and the guy still did not understand 
because we did not speak their language. So some language training 
would be nice. 
 
20. Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, 
reconstruction and partnering with the U.S. military that you would 
like to discuss?  
 
What is interesting is that I was talking to that guy I mention earlier and we 
were talking about the American way, birthday cards, Christmas, and the 
holidays, and how we indirectly impose that on the rest of the world, and it 
is going to be difficult to do reconstruction when they don’t believe in what 
we believe and the way we live our lives. Some say it would be good if 
Saddam was still in power and it was bad for some people but it was 
stable . 
 
21.  What else could be done?  
 
We need to have events to promote socializing and friendship amongst 
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APPENDIX D 
NAVY IP 1 
 
1. What branch of service are you in? U.S. Navy 
 
2.  How long have you been in the military? Eight years 
 





4.  What is your age? 30 
 
5.  What countries have you been deployed to?  
 
Iraq.... I have visited Spain, England, Malta, Greece. 
 
6.  How many times were you deployed to the Middle East?  
 
Once on boots on ground and once to the Gulf 
 
7.  How long were your deployments?  
 
Both of them were 6 months 
 
8.  Did you interact with the local population? No 
 
9. How did you interact with the local population? N/A 
 
10. What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and 
community growth in the country you were deployed in?  
 
Reducing the violence, providing security, and rebuilding critical 
infrastructure (railroads, electricity, sewers) 
 
11.  What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you 
for interactions with other cultures?  
 
I received cultural awareness training for approx two to three hours total 
(left hand is dirty hand, accept food or drink when offered, etc.). 
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12. What training do you think would have made you more prepared for 




13. Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, 
reconstruction and collaborating with the U.S. military that you 
would like to discuss?  
 
The number of contractors and businesses benefiting from Iraq is 
staggering. I was surprised by the number of contractors in noncombat 
roles in areas ranging from accounting to engineering. On the other hand, 




NAVY IP 2 
 
1. What branch of service are you in? US Navy 
2.  How long have you been in the military? 14 years. 
3.   What occupational community do you belong to in your branch of 
service?   
Information Professional Community. 
4.   What is your age?  39 
5.   What countries have you been deployed to?  
Misawa Japan, Iraq. 
6.   How many times were you deployed to the Middle East? 1 
7.   How long were your deployments? 1 year 
8.   Did you interact with the local population? Very little  
9. How did you interact with the local population?  
Contractors helped us move from one side (site) to another.  
10. What issues do you believe are the most important for individual and 
community growth in the country you were deployed in?  
 
Knowing the customs and beliefs of the Iraq people. Knowing their 
religious beliefs. Typical we just do not know the customs and beliefs. It 
was difficult because they didn’t get the training before deploying to Iraq. 
So having something emplaced during training cycle would help. (IP 2) 
 
11. Could you help me understand how people in Turkey/Iraq/Saudi 
Arabia choose their friends and partners?   
 




12. Who are the most influential groups in a typical social network?  
 
The older men (males). Especially if they are in a high positions in the 
church   
 
13. In places where outside forces, such as the United Nations or 
American military, are active, what opportunities and challenges 
does this present for people in the community?  
 
The Iraq people had to be careful talking or interacting with the US people 
because they didn’t want to become a target. So they had to be careful on 
befriending people.  
 
14. Could you tell how the local people from the country you were 
deployed to form opinions about whether certain military actions are 
good or bad?  
 
Never discussed any military actions with the contractors or Iraq people. 
 
15. Following a change in government, what factors most likely lead 
some people to support development of their businesses and 
society, and what factors lead others to oppose development?  
 
One factor that would encourage if their where any terrorists activity in that 
business district 
 
16. What did the U.S. military do to make life better in country x or other 
Middle Eastern nations?  
 
Give gifts to an orphanage during Christmas. Helped build schools. 
 
17. What did the U.S. military do to make life more difficult in country x 
or other Middle Eastern nations?  
 
The Iraq people are proud people. Just the US presence makes it difficult.  
 
18.  What training did you receive before deployment that prepared you 
for interactions with other cultures?  
 






19. What training do you think would have made you more prepared for 
cooperative engagements with the local culture?  
 
Some type of briefs on how to interact with the local people in Iraq. 
 
20. Are there any further issues or situations about regional stability, 
reconstruction and partnering with the U.S. military that you would 
like to discuss?  
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